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Abstract: 
Depersonalization disord r is a psychiatric condition in which there 
is a pervasive change in the quality of subjective experience, in the 
absence of psychosis. The core complaint is a persistent and 
disturbing feeling that experience of oneself and the world has 
become empty, lifeless, and not fully real. A greatly reduced 
emotional responsivity, or ‘de-affectualization’, is frequently 
described. This article examines the phenomenology and 
neurobiology of DPD with a particular emphasis on the emotional 
aspects. It is argued that the study of DPD may provide valuable 
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Depersonalization disorder is a psychiatric condition in which there is a pervasive change in 
the quality of subjective experience, in the absence of psychosis. The core complaint is a 
persistent and disturbing feeling that experience of oneself and the world has become empty, 
lifeless, and not fully real. A greatly reduced emotional responsivity, or ‘de-affectualization’, 
is frequently described. This article examines the phenomenology and neurobiology of DPD 
with a particular emphasis on the emotional aspects. It is argued that the study of DPD may 

















































































Introduction and general overview of DPD 
 
The term ‘depersonalization’ was first coined by Dugas in 1898 (see Berrios and Sierra, 
1997), and denotes a state in which the sense of self and the quality of subjective first-person 
experience are oddly altered, such that the person feels somehow alienated or estranged from 
themselves (depersonalization) and/or their surroundings (derealization). While psychiatric 
classification and literature distinguish between ‘depersonalization’ (DP) and ‘derealization’ 
(DR), in practice these two phenomena often co-occur. Some patients with persistent 
depersonalization symptoms may find the DP/DR distinction does not ring true for them, as 
they experience both as part of the same essential alteration of experience (Sierra, 2009). In 
this article, as in most work on this topic, the term ‘depersonalization’ will be used to denote 
this general alteration of subjective experience, so can be taken as including derealization, as 
well as other experiential aspects explored below. 
 
Brief, self-limiting episodes of mild depersonalization are usually not pathological: indeed 
they are common among the general population, particularly under conditions of stress and 
fatigue: the ‘spaced out’, unreal feeling induced by jet-lag is an example, while many 
psychoactive drugs, including alcohol, may produce transient experiences of 
depersonalization (Medford et al 2003). However, depersonalization can occur as a persistent, 
pervasive phenomenon, causing subjective distress and functional impairment. This may be 
in the context of another neurological or psychiatric disorder, such as major depression or 
post-traumatic stress disorder, or it may occur as a primary phenomenon, in which case it is 
classified as a condition in its own right: depersonalization disorder (DPD). 
 
































































The two major classificatory systems used in contemporary psychiatry are the DSM-IV 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, American Psychiatric Association) and the ICD-10 
(International Classification of Diseases, World Health Organisation). While there are some 
important differences between them, they are largely in accord regarding diagnostic criteria 
for DPD (Medford et al 2005): for a diagnosis, there should be persistent symptoms of 
DP/DR, which should not occur as part of another disorder or be directly substance-induced, 
and the individual should not be suffering from psychosis (which would imply a different 
diagnosis, such as schizophrenia). DSM adds the criterion that there should be significant 
distress and/or functional impairment- this seems appropriate, as without either of these it is 
hard to argue that the phenomena can usefully be seen as pathological.  
 
Population and clinic surveys suggest that clinically significant depersonalization (due to 
either primary DPD, or secondary to another condition) affects 1-2% of the population 
(Hunter et al, 2004), and that the onset is most commonly in adolescence or early adulthood. 
The condition may go undiagnosed for many years, presumably because the topic lacks 
prominence among psychiatrists and their colleagues in other medical disciplines (Baker et al 
2003). There are reports of successful treatment with a range of psychological and 
pharmacological interventions, but as yet no strong, large-scale evidence for any specific 





































































Phenomenology of DPD: the syndrome approach and the importance of ‘de-affectualization’. 
 
Attempts to describe and understand the depersonalized state evoke fundamental questions: 
what do we mean by “sense of self”? How is such a sense generated and maintained? If a 
person says their surroundings feel “unreal”, yet knows that they are in fact real, what might 
this tell us about the phenomenology of experience? The brief descriptions in DSM-IV and 
ICD-10 only hint at this complexity. When ICD-10 notes that “the sufferer complains that his 
or her mental activity, body, and/or surroundings are changed in their quality”, however, it is 
possible to see that almost any aspect of first-person experience is, in theory, available for 
inclusion in the definition. Despite this, it is not always appreciated that, in both practice 
(evidence from symptom surveys) as well as theory (the scope of the formal ICD definition), 
DPD usually involves symptoms in a number of different domains. Sierra et al (2005) 
observe that patients with DPD may complain of “numbed emotional experiencing, 
heightened self-observation; altered body experience, feelings of not being in control of 
movement; changes in the experiencing of time and space; feelings of mind emptiness, 
inability to imagine things”, as well as perceptual anomalies e.g the external world seeming 
oddly flat and two-dimensional, or colours seeming less (or, sometimes, more) vivid than 
previously.  
 
Various terms have been coined to describe domains of symptoms within DPD. Davidson 
(1966) suggested the term “de-affectualization” to denote the change in emotional experience 
commonly reported by patients with DPD, in which there is a persistent diminution or loss of 
emotional reactivity, and emotions seem to lack spontaneity and subjective validity. There are 
remarkably consistent first-person accounts of de-affectualization in both older and more 
































































recent literature (Mayer-Gross, 1935, Shorvon et al 1946, Baker et al, 2003,Simeon and 
Abugel 2006). Davidson also proposed the term “desomatization” to describe altered body 
experience in DPD- typically this involves reduction, loss or alteration of bodily sensations, 
and a sense of disembodiment; there may be a raised pain threshold and patients may report a 
disturbance in the sense of ownership of body parts e.g. a patient may look at his hands and 
say they do not seem like his hands, even though he knows they are his and that he has 
control over them. Issues arising from disturbances of bodily feeling are discussed elsewhere 
in this special issue by Colombetti and Ratcliffe. 
 
In addition, the term “de-ideation” has been suggested (Taylor, 1982) for anomalous 
experiences of thought, concentration, memory and mental imagery. Difficulty in 
concentrating is a particularly common complaint in DPD, with patients often describing this 
in physical terms e.g. “I feel as if my head is full of cotton wool”. (Medford et al, 2005).  
 
Empirical evidence supporting a syndrome concept of depersonalization comes from a study 
of patient responses to the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS). The CDS (Sierra and 
Berrios, 2000) is a self-report scale which probes a range of experiences associated with 
DPD, and factor analysis of patient responses suggests a consistent pattern of symptom 
clusters within DPD, summarized by the following headings: ‘Anomalous Body Experience’, 
‘Emotional Numbing’, 'Anomalous Subjective Recall’, and ‘Alienation From Surroundings’ 
(Sierra et al, 2005). These are essentially analogous to the terms desomatization, de-
affectualization, de-ideation, and derealization. Using a similar method with a larger sample, 
a more recent study by another group gave strikingly similar results (Simeon et al, 2008). 

































































It can be seen from the above that the phenomenon of ‘de-affectualization’ or emotional 
numbing has been consistently described as a core feature of the syndrome. Indeed this 
observation probably predates even the coining of the term “depersonalization”. Some sixty 
years before Dugas, Zeller reported five patients who “complained almost in the same terms 
of a lack of sensations ... to them it was a total lack of feelings, as if they were dead ... they 
claimed they could think clearly, and properly about everything, but the essential was lacking 
even in their thoughts ...” (Zeller, 1838, trans. in Berrios and Sierra, 1997). However, de-
affectualization in DPD is not usually accompanied by the objectively blunted affect often 
seen in chronic schizophrenia  (Ackner 1954, Torch 1978). 
 
Yet this gives rise to an apparent paradox: if reduced emotional experience is a core feature 
of DPD, how can this be reconciled with the high levels of subjective distress reported by 
sufferers? Throughout the literature, first-person reports emphasise the deeply unpleasant and 
disturbing aspect of the experience (Mayer-Gross 1935, Shorvon 1946, Sims 1995, Baker et 
al 2003). Sims (1995) quotes one patient as saying: “I feel very weird in my head. I have a 
great deal of torment. My mind will not leave me alone…. I feel as if I’m lost in a fog. I just 
feel as if I’m not in my head. I feel numb.” This quote contains statements exemplifying both 
aspects of this apparent contradiction: subjective distress (“I have a great deal of torment”) 
and diminished sensitivity to experience (“I feel numb”). It is significant that the distress is 
described as arising from the unpleasantness of the depersonalization experience itself: this is 
a consistent theme in patient self-reports. At the same time, there is reduced responsivity to 
the external world, experienced as distant, lifeless, unreal, and lacking in emotional content. 
A patient seen by the present author made the remark: “I don’t have any emotions- it makes 
































































me so unhappy”. This may seem self-contradictory, but on further questioning, he explained 
that he experienced considerable inner turmoil, related to his experience of being altered and 
‘not himself’, but felt little or no emotional response to external events or other people. 
Ackner (1954) details similar descriptions by patients, and suggests that in DPD there is an 
“increased responsiveness for anxiety of internal origin, whereas that of external origin [is] 
reduced”. How can this be? One way of solving this apparent contradiction is through the 
consideration of attentional processes. Throughout the DPD literature it is noted that  
sufferers tend to focus attention on inner sensations and concerns, at the expense of attending 
to the external world (see Hunter et al, 2003, for a review). If attention is persistently drawn 
to the strangely altered inner feelings that are the core of the condition, the corresponding 
lack of attentional focus on the outside world may contribute to the sense that the world has 
become somehow distant and unreal. This attentional imbalance may explain the combination 
of a subjective experience of inner turmoil with emotional unresponsivity to external events. 
The putative connection between attentional style and altered emotional experience in DPD 
merits further research, particularly around the possibility that exercises aimed at re-orienting 
attention  could have a role in treatment (Hunter et al, 2003). 
 
The idea that a pervasive disturbance of subjective feelings was the key to understanding the 
depersonalization experience enjoyed considerable currency among German writers of the 
early 20th century, the position exemplified by Osterreich: “we postulate that at the 
foreground [of depersonalization] there is a more or less generalized inhibition of feelings 
that leads to a reduction of self-feelings and self-awareness” (Osterreich, 1907, trans. Berrios 
and Sierra, 1997). The apparent dampening, or even ‘shutting down’, of emotional responses 
in DPD is consistent with the notion that depersonalization arises as a defence against 
anxiety, threat, or negative emotional experience in general. In psychoanalytic theory, 
































































depersonalization has long been considered a defence mechanism, though the specific details 
of this idea vary widely between different schools and theorists (Ambrosino, 1976). Healthy 
people exposed to life-threatening danger almost always report at least some features of 
depersonalization (Noyes, Jr. and Kletti, 1977), supporting the idea that depersonalization 
may be a normal response to overwhelming threat, and that pathological depersonalization 
may be understood as a state that arises in susceptible individuals in whom this response is 
triggered at lower thresholds. This relates to an idea expressed over 70 years ago by Mayer-
Gross, who conceived of depersonalization as a “pre-formed response of the brain” i.e. a 
particular psychophysiological state that could be induced by certain circumstances or 
stimuli, such as situations involving threat (Mayer-Gross, 1935). Clinically, there is often an 
impression that depersonalization arises in individuals predisposed to anxiety, and because 
the depersonalization experience is itself strange and unsettling, it generates further anxiety, 
which in turn serves to reinforce and perpetuate the depersonalization (Medford et al, 2005). 
Anxiety-related ruminations and behaviours associated with chronic DP/DR may involve 
obsessional self-checking (frequently checking one’s own inner state- “do I feel real now?”- 
in a way that probably promotes further estrangement from immediate experience, see Torch 
1978) and/or persistent worries that the DP/DR symptoms r present incipient madness, or are 
caused by some serious condition such as a brain tumour (Simeon and Hollander 1993). 
Hunter et al (2003) outlined a cognitive-behavioural conception of DPD, based on the idea 
that anxiety-related cognitions and behaviours can exacerbate and perpetuate DP/DR 
symptoms, are an important factor in the development of chronicity (persistence of symptoms 
over time) in primary DPD, and can be identified and worked on as part of a psychological 
treatment approach to DPD. While this approach may have some explanatory power- and 
therapeutic merits- in cases where such anxieties are prominent, it does not claim to offer an 
explanation of how DP/DR symptoms initially arise- it primarily addresses cognitions 
































































associated with, and consequent upon, DP/DR experiences, rather than the actual experiences 
themselves. A cognitivist account of DPD may therefore be helpful in identifying patterns of 
thought and behaviour often associated with DP/DR symptoms and which may be usefully 
addressed in treatment. But such an account will struggle to account for the experiential core 
of the condition, particularly the emotional and somatic features.    
 
 Overall, then,  there are both phenomenological and aetiological reasons for placing emotion 
at the heart of any attempt to further understand depersonalization.  
 
 
Empirical studies of DPD: insights for emotion research 
 
If this approach to understanding de-affectualization is correct, a testable prediction is that 
DPD patients should show attenuated responses to experimentally presented emotional 
stimuli. A number of studies have tested this idea. Sierra et al (2002) used skin conductance 
recording to probe autonomic arousal in response to emotionally salient images, and found 
that DPD patients showed significantly attenuated responses to unpleasant images 
specifically. A functional MRI study of memory for emotional and neutral words found that 
patients with DPD showed similar neural activation patterns regardless of the emotional 
salience of the presented stimuli, in contrast to a healthy control group who showed extensive 
emotion-related activations not seen in response to the neutral stimuli (Medford et al 2006).  
































































Another functional neuroimaging study of interest here is a PET study of 8 patients with DPD 
(Simeon et al 2000). In this study, patients with DPD were found to differ significantly from 
controls in activation in regions of temporal and parietal sensory association cortex. The 
authors suggest that these findings reflect the failure of normal integration of sensation and 
awareness in DPD- an idea related to comments on insula function above. Differences in 
insula activity were not found, however, but the cognitive task used during scanning, a simple 
verbal learning paradigm, was not designed to probe emotional processing or the generation 
of feelings, so may not have specifically engaged insula in the controls.  
 
Phillips et al (2001) used functional MRI to study neural responses to alternating blocks of 
aversive and neutral scenes. Results from a small (n=6) DPD group were compared with 
healthy and clinical control groups. Compared to the other two groups, the DPD group 
showed significantly reduced neural responses in brain regions associated with emotional 
processing, particularly anterior insula, when viewing aversive scenes. There was also some 
evidence that a region of right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) was involved in 
inhibiting the neural response to aversive material. 
 
A more recent fMRI study (Medford et al, manuscript in preparation) used a similar paradigm 
in a larger group of DPD patients (n=14). In comparison to healthy controls, patients showed 
a significant absence of activation in the left anterior insula (LAI) in response to aversive 
images. 10 of the 14 patients repeated the scanning paradigm after 4-8 months of 
pharmacotherapy. In patients reporting significant clinical improvement, there was activation 
of LAI present in response to emotional images at time 2, and this region was significantly 
more active in patients whose symptoms had improved than in those whose symptoms had 
































































not.  A region of right VLPFC, the same area identified in Phillips et al (2001, see above) as 
being involved in the suppression of emotional responses, was active in DPD patients at time 
1, but only in non-improved patients at time 2.  
 
These findings are of great interest because they link in with key issues in the contemporary 
neuroscience of emotional experience, emotion regulation, and self-related processes. The 
anterior insula appears to be underactive during emotional stimulation in DPD, and this area 
has been identified as a key brain region in the generation of subjective feeling states. The 
influential work of Damasio and colleagues has centred around the idea that feeling states are 
produced by the integration of bodily sensations into conscious awareness (e.g. Damasio 
2003), so that subjective feelings arise out of signals from afferent somatosensory systems, 
which in combination produce ‘interoception’, definable as ‘a sense of the internal milieu’ 
(Craig 2002). A wealth of converging evidence suggests that the anterior insula is a crucial 
‘hub’ for this process (see Craig 2002, Craig 2009, Medford and Critchley 2010 for reviews).  
Across functional neuroimaging studies, anterior insula activation has been reported in a wide 
range of experimental contexts involving physical sensation or the induction of feeling states, 
including tactile stimulation, sexual arousal, visceral distension, happiness, anger, fear, 
sadness, and feelings of romantic love. Studies that have probed interoceptive awareness 
directly (e.g. by asking participants to make judgements about the timing of their own 
heartbeats, as in Critchley et al, 2004) have identified anterior insula activity as directly 
correlated with such awareness, and statistically significant correlations between 
interoceptive awareness and self-reported emotional experience have also been demonstrated 
(Feldman Barrett et al 2004).  
 
































































In DPD, then, it is possible to see anterior insula underactivity as the key neural correlate of 
the self-reported experience of de-affectualization. The involvement of anterior insula in 
representations of bodily state further suggests that reduced activity of this region may also 
be the biological substrate of the ‘desomatisation’ aspect of DPD symptomatology. It is not 
being conceptually greedy to link both these symptom domains with the anterior insula: the 
evidence that bodily sensations and feeling states are integrated in anterior insula is now 
sufficiently strong (Craig, 2009) to make this a logical suggestion. Indeed one can go further 
and suggest that this alteration in the quality of bodily and emotional experience is the 
essential core of DPD: if subjective feelings are derived from higher order representations of 
bodily states in anterior insula, then abnormalities of this process can, in theory, have 
consequences for the whole spectrum of first-person experience, as is the case in DPD (see 
also Colombetti and Ratcliffe, this issue). If this is correct, then one might predict that DP/DR 
symptoms may occur when there is disturbance of sensory systems. There is some evidence 
that this is true. Symptoms of depersonalization are significantly more common in patients 
with vestibular disease than would be expected by chance (Sang et al 2006), giving rise to the 
idea that depersonalization may arise when sensory deficits give rise to disorientation: if 
perceptions of the spatial relationship of the body to external reality are unreliable, this may 
predispose to a more general experience of strangeness and unreality, as occurs in DPD 
(Jauregui-Renaud et al 2008).  
 
As detailed above, fMRI data suggest a role for right VLPFC (Brodmann Area 47) in the 
suppression of emotional responses in DPD. Studies of healthy participants have identified 
this area as involved in the control of emotion (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Ohira et al, 2006). 
A recent study of the regulation of both positive and negative emotion found this area to be 
involved in emotion regulation in general, but most particularly when participants were 
































































attempting to decrease the experience of negative emotional responses (Kim and Hamann, 
2007). Perhaps most significantly, a study of cognitive reappraisal (a mental strategy of 
deliberate conscious reframing or reinterpretation of emotional material in such a way as to 
reduce its affective impact) found that right VLPFC activity was closely associated with 
successful (i.e. emotion-reducing) reappraisal, and identified a pathway from right VLPFC 
through nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum, which appears to be specialised for the 
inhibition of responses to aversive stimuli (Wager et al, 2008). This is of potential relevance 
to DPD, firstly because the area of right VLPFC identified by these authors is anatomically 
very close to that repeatedly identified in DPD, but also because in DPD, there is a clinical 
impression that patients unwittingly tend towards a ruminative intellectualisation of 
emotional issues and situations (Torch, 1978; Hunter et al, 2003, Medford et al, 2005), which 
may be analogous to cognitive reappraisal. All these studies examine the voluntary 
suppression of emotional responses: in DPD such suppression is apparently involuntary (and 
largely resistant to volitional control), but it is reasonable to suppose that this will 
nevertheless engage similar inhibitory networks. 
 
Future directions 
While this paper has focused on primary DPD, symptoms of depersonalization are common 
outside of this clinical context, occurring in a range of neuropsychiatric conditions. With 
regard to schizophrenia in particular, there is a  longstanding current of thought that regards 
DP/DR as important early symptoms in the development of schizophreniform psychosis (e.g. 
Huber’s notion of ‘basic symptoms’ in schizophrenia, see Gross 1997). Yet there has been 
very little empirical research examining the prevalence and character of DP/DR symptoms in 
this wider clinical arena, or how such symptoms relate to other aspects of specific conditions. 
































































More research along these lines has the potential to substantially improve our understanding 
of the experiences of patients, and to suggest new psychotherapeutic and pharmacological 






Depersonalization, both as a primary disorder (DPD) and as a phenomenon in general, 
provides an unusual and valuable real-life sounding board for important ideas about the 
nature of first-person experience, the processes through which feelings are generated, and the 
ways in which subjective experiences shape an individual’s sense of themselves. Empirical 
studies of DPD can shed light on the psychological and biological processes that underpin 
these sometimes abstract concepts. It is to be hoped that this hitherto little-studied condition 
will become a focus of interest for neuroscientists and philosophers working on these issues, 
and yield insights of relevance not only to psychiatry but also to the wider understanding of 
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